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nished by cross-examination and that no statement should be used as
testimony until it has undergone that test. This seems to indicate that
the Court is of the opinion that the right of confrontation and cross-
examination is a basic right guaranteed under the Constitution and
when the question is met it will so hold. The dissent in the principal
case was of this opinion when it said: "While the Court disclaims de-
ciding this constitutional question, no one reading the opinion will doubt
that the explicit language of its broad sweep speaks in prophecy. '8 4
There is much more involved than the accused employee's right to
work.a5 It is submitted that there is a right not to have unchallenged
and unverified suspicion and contempt with their concomitant social
and economic disadvantage cast upon an individual and his family. This
writer suggests that the due process clause does require the accused be
given an opportunity to face his accusers and to cross-examine them,
and that a decision by the Court to this effect would be fully warranted.
OLIVER W. ALPHiN
Constitutional Law-Right To Travel and Area Restrictions-
Foreign Relations Power
Worthy v. Herter1 involved a newspaperman who was denied a re-
newal 2 of his passport when he would not agree to comply with the area
restrictions3 stamped on it. The issue presented was whether the Secre-
tary of State had the power to prevent the travel of a law-abiding United
States citizen to certain areas of the world in a time when the nation
is not at war. The federal district court dismissed the action which
sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the Secretary
of State. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed
3 4 Id. at 524.
11 The writer has made no distinction in his discussion between the rights of
private and government employees. It is submitted that there is no valid distinction
to be made. Both require security clearances; the effect of dismissal is the same;
the constitutional guarantees appear to be the same. Compare Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923), and Trauax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915), with Slochower v.
Bd. of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956), and Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183(1952). The danger to national security is the same, Parker v. Lester, 112 F.
Supp. 433 (N.D. Cal. 1953), and each is in fact engaged in government work, often
at the same place.
1270 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 918 (1959).
'It appears that Worthy had traveled to Hungary and Communist China on his
previous passport. This would explain why the State Department took occasion
to ask Worthy about his intended use of a renewed passport.
At the present time the following inscription is stamped in U.S. passports:
"This passport is not valid for travel to the following areas under control of
authorities with which the United States does not have diplomatic relations: Al-
bania, Bulgaria, and those portions of China, Korea and Viet Nam under Com-
munist control." Hearings Before Senate Foreign Relations Committee on De-
partment of State Passport Policies, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1957) [hereinafter
cited as 1957 Hearings].
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and concluded that the Secretary did have such power both statutorily
and inherently within the executive control of foreign relations.4 The
Supreme Court denied petition for certiorari. 5
The individual's freedom of movement, the right to leave one's own
country and go to any other, is the interest for which the court's pro-
tection was sought in the Worthy case. The idea that an individual
is free to move from place to place in the world, barring war or criminal
indictment, has very old roots in Anglo-American jurisprudence. Magna
Charta first guaranteed the right in 1215: "It shall be lawful in future for
anyone.., to leave our kingdom and to return, safe and secure by land
and water, except for a short period in time of war ... ."6 The only
limitation imposed upon this freedom by the King was the ancient writ
of ne exeat regno7 ("let him not leave the realm"). Apparently this
writ still survives in England today, but its use in the name of the
Crown seems definitely restricted to times of war.8
The right to travel finds expression in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, adopted in the General Assembly of the United Nations,
December 10, 1948. Article 13 provides: "1. Everyone has the right
to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.
2. Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and
to return to his country."
9
Contemporary writers agree that freedom to travel is a natural
right and that its unfettered exercise is in the best interest of a free
and self-enlightening society.10 The fact that no specific mention is
made of the right in the United States Constitution has usually been in-
terpreted by writers in this field to mean that it was regarded as un-
challenged, basic, and essential."' Freedom to travel has been intimately
associated with other American freedoms. Protection of a property in-
'The scope of this note in intended to extend primarily to a discussion of
the foreign relations power of the United States Government and how it bears
on freedom to travel. The passport problem itself is only incidental to this dis-
cussion. For a more complete treatment of the passport cases and authorities per
se see Note, 37 N.C.L. RFv. 172 (1958).
361 U.S. 918 (1959).0 Clause 42 of the Magna Charta of 1215. BARRINGTON, THE MAGNA CHARTA
AND OTHER GREAT CHARTERS OF ENGLAND 240 (1900). Although this clause was
left out of Magna Charta after 1215, it has been argued that the broad grant of lib-
erty contained in it represented the common law, which, according to one authority,
recognized the right of everyone to leave the kingdom at his pleasure. BEAMES,
NE ExEAT REGNO, A BRIEF VIEW OF THE WRIT (1st Am. ed. 1821).
" BEAmES, op. cit. supra, note 6.
'VII HALsBuRY, LAws OF ENGLAND 293-94 (3d ed. 1954).
'3 DOCUMENTS ON FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS 960-61 (Chafee ed. 1952).
10 See CHAFEE, THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION (1956); Mc-
Dougal and Leighton, The Rights of Man in the World Coinrunity, 14 LAW &
CONTEMP. SocIETY 490 (1949) ; Note, Passports and Freedom of Travel, 41 GEO.
L.J. 63 (1952).
"J affe, The Right to Travel: The Passport Problem, 35 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
17-20 (1950).
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terest, for example, may be involved where travel abroad is essential to
a person's livelihood. A religious calling may require a person to travel
overseas. The "right to know," to be informed about other lands and
peoples, depends on the basic freedom of international mobility.
In recent history the right to travel has been recognized by two im-
portant cases, Shactman v. Dulles'2 and Kent v. Dulles."8 In Shactnman
the appellant had been denied a passport in the "best interests of the
country" because he was the head of an organization on the Attorney
General's list of subversive groups. The Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia held the denial was an arbitrary restraint on the indi-
vidual's liberty and ordered that the passport be issued.
The right to travel, to go from place to place ... is a natural
right subject to the rights of others and to reasonable regulation
under law. A restraint imposed by the Government of the United
States upon this liberty, therefore, must conform with the pro-
visions of the Fifth Amendment that 'no person shall be . . .
deprived of. .. liberty.. . without due process of law."14
In Kent v. Dulles'5 the Supreme Court recognized this right and stated
that it is a part of the "liberty" guaranteed by the fifth amendment, and
therefore it may not be infringed without due process of law.10 In Kent
the Court held that the Secretary has no statutory authority to deny
passports on the basis of political beliefs or associations. 17
The problem in the principal case is a new one to the courts but not
to American citizens. In the 1930's the first positive area restrictions
were imposed on United States citizens through passport control. Travel
to Ethiopia was prohibited in 1935, and to Spain during the Civil War
of 1936-39,18 and to China in 1937.19 Apparently these travel restric-
tions were never challenged, one possible explanation being that travel
without a passport was still possible to some extent. Furthermore the
11225 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
13 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
111225 F.2d at 941.
357 U.S. 116 (1958). Here the passport denial rested on Communist affilia-
tion and refusal to sign the non-Communist affidavit. The Court met squarely the
issue of the Secretary of State's discretion over issuance of passports under exist-
ing statutes. Since the right to travel is an element of liberty protected by the fifth
amendment, the Court points out, Congress alone has the power to establish sub-
stantive grounds for denial of passports, which are now regarded as essential to
travel abroad. The Court found that Congress bad intended that a person might
be refused a passport only if his citizenship was in question or if he was accused of
a crime.
18 357 U.S. at 125.
27 Id. at 128, 130.132 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 406A (2d rev. ed. 1945).
193 HACxWoRTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 532 (1942). It is interesting
to note that in all three of these periods a war was in progress within the coun-
try to which travel was prohibited. At the time of the passport denial in the
principal case no war was in progress on the Chinese mainland.
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area restrictions, with the exception of those relating to Spain, were of
short duration.
The "cold war" following World War II and the emergence of Red
China have presented the United States government with difficult prob-
lems in the conduct of foreign relations. While trying to establish an
equilibrium and to normalize its relations with the older part of the Com-
munist world, i.e., Soviet Russia, the government has officially ignored
the newer Communist countries. Out of this situation has arisen the
latest governmental policy of forbidding travel in countries whose gov-
ernments are not recognized by the United States.20  In May 1952 the
Department of State began stamping passports invalid for the U.S.S.R.,
China, and the Soviet satellite states except on special application to
the Department.21 Then in October 1955 Russia and most of her satel-
lites22 were opened to travel; but all passports were stamped with the
statement that they were not valid for travel to Albania, Bulgaria, and
those portions of China, Korea, and Viet Nam under Communist con-
trol.2
Recently a Congressman interested in traveling in the Far East to
obtain information regarding United States relations and policies in that
area was denied a passport for Red China.24 In the State Department
letter denying the Congressman's request several basic tenets under-
lying the China travel ban were revealed-namely, the existence of "a
state of unresolved conflict" stemming from the Korean action, lack of
diplomatic relations, inability "to provide the customary protection," and
the maltreatment of Americans on the mainland. More significant, how-
ever, is the statement that the Congressman's presence in China might
be taken for a change in policy.2 5
The rationale of area retrictions has most often been stated in terms
of the local dangers to the traveler and the lack of diplomatic channels
through which to extricate him from detention.20 These criteria have
not been applied uniformly. In 1957, for example, the ban was lifted for
"' In the case of Soviet Russia after 1923 and before United States recognition,
there was no travel ban. 1957 Hearings, op. cit. supra note 3, at 65.211957 Hearings, op. cit. supra note 3, at 65.
"Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania.
23 See note 3 supra.
2, The district court in dismissing Porter v. Herter, - F. Supp. - (D.D.C.
1959), cited Worthy and refused to find a difference between an ordinary citizen
and a Congressman travelling in an unofficial capacity. A petition for writ of
certiorari has been denied. 361 U.S. 918 (1959).
5 Letter from William B. Macomber, Jr., Assistant Secretary, to the Hon.
Charles 0. Porter, House of Representatives, July 2, 1959. (Exhibit B in the
complaint of Porter v. Herter, - F. Supp. - (D.D.C. 1959).)
2 SPECIAL COmmITTEE To STUDY PASSPORT PROCEDURES OF THE AssoCIATIoN
OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF Nmv YORK, FREEDOM TO TRAVEL 53 (1959) [herein-
after cited as FREEDOM To TRAVEL].
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short visits to Albania 7 and Bulgaria28 by persons with compelling pro-
fessional reasons. In the case of Red China, three classes of persons
have been granted passports valid for travel to that country. The first
group consisted of the mothers and one brother of three Americans held
prisoners there.29 Also a lawyer representing defendants charged with
sedition was permitted to go to China in order to gather data for their
defense.30 The largest group receiving the Secretary's approval con-
sisted of twenty-four newsmen, specially selected on the basis of their
papers' foreign news coverage,31 who were authorized to stay in Red
China for six months. These exceptions indicate that the State De-
partment's prime object is the success of its foreign policy and not the
safety of individual Americans.
This rationale finds expression in the Worthy opinion, where the
court approves another reason for imposing area restrictions, namely
the prevention of possible "clashes" caused by Americans in "trouble
spots" of the world.32 - The decision rests on statutory authority and on
the President's executive power in the foreign relations field. "It is
settled that in respect to foreign affairs the President has the power of
action and the courts will not attempt to review the merits of what he
does. The President is the nation's organ in and for foreign affairs."38
"We think the designation of certain areas of the world as forbidden to
American travelers falls within the power to conduct foreign affairs. 384
This language of the court suggests two inter-related concepts of
American constitutional law, the foreign relations power and the political
question doctrine.
The "foreign relations power" refers to the ability of the United
States government to carry on official intercourse with other nations. 5
The Constitution makes no specific grant of a "foreign relations power."
Rather it allocates to the President the treaty-making function, the
power to appoint and receive diplomatic agents, and the command of the
army and navy.3 6 The Constitution grants to Congress the power (1) to
establish and collect customs and duties, (2) to regulate foreign com-
merce, (3) to establish naturalization laws, (4) to declare war, and
(5) to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high
2 Washington Post and Times Herald, Nov. 15, 1957, § A, p. 12, col. 4.
N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1957, p. 1, col. 3 (city ed.).
" N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1957, p. 1, col. 1 (city ed.).
" The lawyer was Mr. A. L. Wirin. N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1957, p. 17, col. 1
(city ed.).
" N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 1957, p. 1, col. 8 (city ed.).
3" 270 F.2d at 910.
33 Id. at 911.
3" Id. at 910.
"United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
"U.S. Coh¢sT. art. II, § 2.
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seas and offenses against the law of nations.3 7 These powers collec--
tively make up the constitutional authority for the regulation of the
country's conduct in respect to other nations.
In 1829 to the Supreme Court in Foster v. Neilson38 first announced
the "political question" doctrine which precludes judicial interference
with governmental action concerning foreign policy. The case dealt with
Spanish lands in the southeastern part of the country. Chief Justice
Marshall, speaking for the Court, declared:
If those departments which are entrusted with the foreign
intercourse of the nation . . . have unequivocally asserted its
rights over a country . . . which it claims under a treaty; if the
legislature has acted on the construction thus asserted, it is not
in its own courts that this construction is to be denied. A ques-
tion like this respecting the boundaries of nations is . . . more
a political than a legal question, and in its discussion, the courts
... must respect the pronounced will of the legislature.3 9
Labelling presidential or congressional action concerning foreign rela-
tions as a "political question," however, does not prevent the court's
looking behind the label, as was done in Worthy.40 The court may ex-
amine what was done in the name of foreign relations or foreign policy,
particularly where the claim is made that constitutional rights have been
infringed.41
When some action of the federal government is under consideration,
the problem before the court is determining what is properly within the
field of foreign relations. It is not an easy determination to make, be-
cause the limits of this power are nowhere defined. The Constitution
in broad terms mentions a few specific powers in the field; significantly,
these constituitonal grants are made both to the President and to Con-
gress. One writer has suggested that the co-existence of these affirma-
tive constitutional grants has assured a struggle between the President
and Congress for the privilege of directing the country's foreign policy.
42
Undoubtedly the President has won the lion's share of the privilege,
43
"U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
8827 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
30 Id. at 309.
40 270 F.2d at 909.
' Although there are no decided cases having to do with an executive invasion
of personal rights as a by-product of the foreign relations power, the point is made
by one writer that the President's acts should be no less subject to judicial review
than are acts of Congress. Carrington, Political Questions: The Tudicial Check
on the Exceutive, 42 VA. L. REv. 175, 184 (1956).
"CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND PowERs 171 (4th ed. 1957).
"The Senate was intended to exercise a special role in the conduct of our
foreign relations, acting like a council in which the "President in Council" could
work out policies and have diplomatic appointments approved. Subsequent events
did not develop this role, and the words "with the advice and consent of the
Senate" have come to mean little more than the power of ratification or veto of
presidential treaty proposals. If, however, the Senate has lost power, certainly
1960]
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and it is the presidential exercise of the foreign relations power which
is most often the object of complaint before the courts. The subjects
dealt with in the cases can be classified as follows: (1) recognition
of foreign governments, 44 (2) assessment of treaty obligations, 4 (3)
resolution of disputed sovereigns, 46 (4) acquisition of new lands,4 7 (5)
participation in ad hoc international bodies, 48 (6) the making of interna-
tional executive agreements,49 and (7) the licensing of domestic carriers
for foreign air routes.50 Not all of these situations involve purely execu-
ive functions; for example, congressional involvement was necessary in
the new lands and international organization cases. Furthermore an act
3f Congress underlay the situation in the foreign air routes case. It
would seem that the plenary power of the President in the field of foreign
relations, so far as the cases are concerned, is fairly limited to recogni-
tion, executive agreements with other governments, and treaty interpre-
tation. None of these traditional subjects was at issue in the principal
case, yet the court has found that the Secretary of State's action in im-
posing area controls is protected by the presidential "power to conduct
foreign affairs."
In the principal case statutory authority, quite apart from the Presi-
dent's inherent power, was held to be equally decisive of the question of
the power of the Secretary of State. Two statutes were found by the
court to be controlling. First, section 211(a) of the basic passport act
of 1926 gives the Secretary of State authority to "grant and issue pass-
the President and to a lesser extent Congress as a whole have gained power. The
task of the President is to formulate and propose the nation's plans for dealing
officially with other nations. The Congress is in a position to support or modify
these plans through control of appropriations and through passage of statutes
governing United States participation in international organizations. See CoRwiN,
op. cit. supra note 42, at 170-226. The recently proposed Bricker Amendment was
an attempt to invest Congress with a larger role in the actual conduct of the country's
international relations. Specifically the proposed amendment was aimed at the
treaty making power and would require action by both houses of Congress, just
as in the.case of any other legislation, lbefore a treaty would become binding as
law. The effect of such a provision would undoubtedly be to reverse the trend of
concentrating the direction of the nation's foreign affairs in the hands of the
President. Congress, however, wisely refused to pass the proposal. See Whitton
and Fowler, Bricker Amendnent-Fallacies and Dangers, 48 Am. J. INT. L. 23(1953); Henkin, The Law of the Land and Foreignr Relations, 107 U. PA. L. Rxv.
403 (1959).
"United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
"It re Cooper, 143 U.S. 472 (1892) ; Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S.(13 Pet.) 415 (1839) ; Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
"Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270 (1902); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
199 (1796).
,"Wilson v. Shaw, 204 U.S. 24 (1907).
"Koki v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197 (1949) (establishment of war crimes tri-
bunal); Z. & F. Assets Realization Corp. v. Hull, 114 F.2d 464 (D.C. Cir.),
aff'd, 311 U.S. 740 (1941) (Mixed Claims Commission, United States and Ger-
many).
"' United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 382 (1950).
'0 Chicago & So. Airlines v. Waterman Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948).
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ports ... under such rules as the President shall designate and pre-
scribe . ."51 Secondly, section 1185(b) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 195252 provides the President with power to declare
a national emergency and makes it unlawful during the declared emer-
gency for American citizens to depart or enter the country without a valid
passport. Under authority of section 211(a) the President in 1938 issued
an executive orderO enabling the Secretary of State in his discretion to
restrict the use of passports on a geographic basis.54 A national emer-
gency now exists by virtue of the President's 1953 proclamation,55
thus activating section 1185(b). The court held that the effect of these
statutes and orders is to grant the Secretary of State a discretionary
power to prohibit travel of Americans to certain areas of the world by
making the passport invalid for use in those areas.
The statutes relied on would appear to be insufficient to sustain so
broad a discretion in the Secretary of State in the issuance of passports.
Both section 211(a) and the executive order issued pursuant to it and
section 1185(b) were strictly construed in Kent v. Dulles50 as not
giving the Secretary "unbridled discretion to grant or withhold a pass-
port from a citizen for any substantive reason he may choose." In
Kent passport denial by the Secretary was based on the applicant's
political associations and beliefs, and this was held to be a substantive
ground not available to the Secretary under existing statutes. An area
restriction would certainly be a substantive ground for denial equally
unavailable without statutory authority.
The language of the Worthy opinion indicates that the existence
of a national emergency extended the scope of section 2 11(a) to include
area restrictions under the power of the President to prescribe rules and
regulations governing passport issuance. 57 The Supreme Court in Kent,
however, was not constrained to expand the Secretary's 211(a) author-
ity, implemented by executive order, on account of an emergency falling
short of war.58 It is submitted that the government's power was over-
reached in Worthy because: (1) section 211(a) and section 1185(b)
do not provide the substantive rules on which passport denial can be
based, and clearly to restrain citizens from going to certain areas of the
144 Stat. 87 (1926), 22 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1952).
566 Stat. 190 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1185(b) (1952).
='Exec. Order No. 7856 (1938), 3 Fed. Reg. 681 (1938).
'"§ 51.75. Refusal to issue passport. The Secretary of State is authorized
in his discretion to refuse to issue a passport, to restrict a passport for use only
in certain countries, to withdraw or cancel a passport already issued, and to with-
draw a passport for the purpose of restricting its validity or use in certain coun-
tries." Ibid.
" Proclamation No. 3004, 67 Stat. c.31 (1953).
r6357 U.S. 116 (1958).
11 270 F.2d at 912.
r8 357 U.S. at 128.
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world is to impose a substantive regulation; (2) the issue of whether
the foreign relations power includes the power in the President to im-
pose area restrictions on individual travel has never been passed upon
by the courts. Furthermore the exercise of the foreign relations power
by the President where it touches personal liberties is subject to the
due process clause of the fifth amendment.59 Under the Kent decision
due process requires an act of Congress to circumscribe the right to
travel.
When the President needs additional powers to carry out the legiti-
mate policies of the government, the customary approach is through the
use of special purpose legislation.60 Where the powers asked for will
infringe basic individual rights, the Congress of course should be certain
the powers are essential and reasonable and that the grant of power is
limited in scope and duration. The current need arises from the
difficulties of carrying out the government's over-all "cold war" policies.
These policies include non-recognition of China, limiting socio-economic
intercourse with the Soviet world, and the military objective of contain-
ing Communist influences throughout the world.61 The President has
said that if these policies are to be successful, then the Secretary of
State must have authority to impose area restrictions on United States
citizens abroad. 62  He asked Congress to provide the needed legislation.
Such legislation has been recommended by a special committee of the
New York Bar studying passport procedures. 3 Whether area restric-
"' United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) ; Shact-
man v. Dulles, 225 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1955).60 CORWIN, op. cit. supra note 42, at 191-92.
Statement by Under Secretary of State Murphy before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, April 2, 1957, 1957 Hearings, op. cit. smpra note 3, at 69;
President's Special Message to Congress, July 7, 1958, 104 CONG. REc. 1832-33
(1958) ; see generally Rostow, American Foreign Policy and International Law,
17 LA. L. REv. 552 (1957).
" President's Special Message to Congress of July 7, 1958, 104 CoNG. REc.
1832-33 (1958). "[T]he secretary should have clear statutory authority to prevent
Americans from using passports for travel to areas where there is no means of
protecting them, or where their presence would conflict with our foreign policy
objectives or be inimical to the security of the United States."
6 'iWithin the area of foreign affairs, the United States has the powers of a
sovereign State and these powers, no matter how divided between them, are vested
in total in the Congress and the President, subject of course to the provisions of
the Constitution. Leaving aside the question of whether or not Congress in 22
U.S.C. § 211a . . . has provided a legislative foundation for executive action,
it is clear that the Congress and the President, acting in concert, may restrict the
travel of Americans to certain areas of the world . . . . The present national
emergency becomes the reason and the occasion for the imposition of restrictions
on the travel of Americans into specified areas, as an instrument in the conduct
of the cold war. The Committee adopts this view in full consciousness that it may
result in restricting the travel of all Americans to certain countries in the national
interest of the United States .... Because of its nature, the restriction on travel
to certain countries or areas should be employed only in situations of gravity and
seriousness.
"[T]he Committee has concluded, on balance, that the authority to prohibit
travel by all United States citizens in areas designated by the Secretary of State
[Vol. 38
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tion as a policy is advisable or not,64 it is clear that statutory limits
should be imposed in pursuing these "cold war" policies as they im-
pinge on the right to travel.
Several bills were introduced in the Eighty-fifth Congress, but no
statute was passed. The Eighty-sixth Congress now has before it some
of the same proposals as well as new ones. There is considerable differ-
ence among them as to the limits of the discretion to be given the Presi-
dent or the Secretary. 65
A two point statute is recommended which would read as follows:
Area restrictions may be imposed on United States citizens
traveling abroad by the President through a directive to the
Secretary of State:
(1) When a state of war exists between this country and the
one to be restricted;
(2) In countries where United States forces are actually engaged
in hostilities.66
There is in such a statute no unbridled discretion "to protect the
nation's best interests" nor power to insure the "orderly conduct of
foreign relations," at the expense of the individual's right to travel, nor
is a necessary instrument to advance the national interest, and it recommends legis-
lation to clear up any doubts as to the possession by the Secretary of State of such
authority. .. ." FREEnOm TO TRAVEL, op. cit. supra note 46, at 52-53, 55.
" The point is made by the authors of the bar committee report that such
restrictions often impose greater penalty on this country than the one against which
it is directed. Id. at 54.
"
5While the 85th Congress failed to enact any legislation in this field, there is
prospect of a statute forthcoming from the 86th Congress. As of this writing the
House has passed H.R. 9069, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), which would give the
President wide discretion in restricting areas of the world to entry by United
States citizens. Essentially the bill provides three criteria for area control: first,
where the United States is at war; second, where actual hostilities are in progress;
and third, where the President finds the national interest at stake either because
of inability to provide protection or because the travel would "seriously impair
the foreign relations of the United States." The Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee has under study at least three different bills, one of which is the Humphrey
Bill (S. 806, 86th Cong., 1st Sss. (1959)) which would restrict the American trav-
eler overseas only when war has been declared or in areas where United States
troops are fighting without a declaration 6f war. Another bill (S. 2287, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1959)) introduced by Senator Fulbright adopts the geographical
limitations of H.R. 9069, supra, but adds a provision to prevent travel abroad of any
U.S. citizen who in the opinion of the Secretary would incite international conflicts
involving the United States. Senator Wiley's bill (S. 2315, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.(1959)) also follows the House bill in the area limitations and provides a unique
provision by which the President may make exceptions to any general geographical
restraints for such persons as newsmen, legislators, doctors and missionaries.
Another interesting feature in every bill here discussed except S. 806 is a penalty
section which makes it a misdemeanor punishable by $1,000 fine or one year's
inprisonment to violate travel bans.
. Such a statute is essentially like that introduced by Senator Humphrey.
S. 806, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
1960]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
any other device by which individual Americans become the unwilling
instruments of foreign policy.
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KENNETH L. PENEGAR
Corporations-Constitutional Law-Retroactive Application of
Curative Statute Affecting Corporate Existence
The case of Lester Bros. v. Pope Realty & Ins. Co.' affirmed the
doctrine of Park Terrace, Inc. v. Phoenix Indem. Co. 2 that a corporation
became dormant when the number of stockholders was reduced to less
than the statutory requirement of three. The court in the Lester case
held that the North Carolina legislature's curative act,3 passed in an
attempt to obviate the Park Terrace doctrine, was of no aid to the de-
fendant Pope because the statute could not operate retroactively to defeat
vested rights. In Park Terrace the result of dormancy was that the sole
stockholder became the real party in interest in a breach of contract suit
brought in the name of the corporation.4 In Lester one of two stock-
holders was made a defendant and was held individually liable for an
extension of credit which had ostensibly been made to the corporation
only.
The plaintiff in Lester had sought to hold defendant Pope individu-
ally liable for certain sales of package houses made to defendant corpora-
tion Pope Realty and Insurance Company. The corporation had been
formed with three stockholders. Between January 12 and June 20, 1955,
the plaintiff delivered three bills of merchandise to the Company which
during this time had only two stockholders. These bills were unpaid,
and this indebtedness comprised part of the claim for which suit was,
brought.5  At trial the Superior Court denied plaintiff's motion for
judgment against Pope individually.
On appeal the Supreme Court cited Park Terrace and stated that
when a corporation had less than three stockholders the stockholders
" There is nothing in the proposed statute which would preclude travel to
areas where the individual's safety might be in doubt. It should be government's
function to forewarn the traveler of the dangers and not to prevent him from
assuming the risk.
1250 N.C. 565, 109 S.E.2d 263 (1959).
2243 N.C. 595, 91 S.E2d 584 (1956). For an extensive discussion of this case
see Note, 34 N.C.L. REv. 531 (1956).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-3.1 (Supp. 1959).
The decision caused much adverse comment. Latty, A Conceptualistic Tangle
and the One- or Two-Man Corporation, 34 N.C.L. REv. 471 (1956); Latty, The
Close Corporation and the New North Carolina Business Corporation Act, 34
N.C.L. REV. 432, 441-44 (1956); Comment, 14 WAsH. & LEE L. Rrv. 72 (1957).
The plaintiff alleged fraud on the part of Pope and sought to hold him liable
on all other deliveries made to the corporation, as well as these three. The Supreme
Court upheld a finding that there was no reliance on his false statements and there-
fore no liability on the basis of fraud.
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